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Can U.S. Safeguard Actions Survive WTO
Review?: Section 201 Investigations in
International Trade Law
DANIEL B. PICKARD* & TINA POTUTO KIMBLE**
I. INTRODUCTION
A "Section 201" investigation is one of the strongest
fundamental trade remedy actions available under U.S. law. This
provision of the Trade Act of 1974 authorizes the U.S.
International Trade Commission ("ITC") to examine whether a
particular import is causing or threatening to cause serious injury
to a domestic industry. Once an import is deemed harmful,
Section 201 provides the President with a range of remedies to
restore balanced competition to the marketplace.3  Recent
decisions by the World Trade Organization ("WTO") have not
only undermined the effectiveness of this significant trade remedy
action, but have also raised important questions concerning U.S.
obligations under international law. As anti-dumping measures
come under increasing attack, the availability of safeguard
provisions to preserve competitive trade is becoming increasingly
* Daniel B. Pickard is a Partner in the International Trade practice of Wiley Rein LLP in
Washington, DC. Mr. Pickard represents client interests in a variety of international trade
matters, including trade remedy actions (such as antidumping and Section 201
investigations), export controls, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, the Foreign Agent
Registration Act, and customs and anti-boycott compliance. Prior to joining Wiley Rein
LLP, Mr. Pickard was an attorney with the Office of General Counsel of the U.S.
International Trade Commission.
** Tina Potuto Kimble was previously with Steptoe and Johnson LLP and has served in the
General Counsel's Office of the International Trade Commission.
1. Letter from the Hon. Jay Rockefeller, U.S. Senator from West Virginia, to the
Hon. Robert B. Zoellick, United States Trade Representative (Oct. 23, 2003) (on file with
author), available at http://www.senate.gov/-rockefeller/news/2003/prlO2303.html.
2. 19 U.S.C. § 2252(b)(1)(A) (2000).
3. Id. § 2253(a)(3)(2000).
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important. Even critics of anti-dumping measures acknowledge
that "a better way to protect industries adjusting to increased
competition would be through the increased use of 'safeguard
[actions] ''
Trade remedy actions are of particular importance in the
negotiations of the Doha Round.! The United States would be
wise to use this opportunity to push its trading partners to re-
examine, clarify, and reach a consensus regarding these safeguard
actions. Other nations have challenged the findings of several
6
Section 201 investigations before the WTO. To date, the result is
the same every time: the WTO strikes down every Section 201
safeguard measure. The WTO consistently finds that the ITC's
positions under U.S. law regarding the definition of "unforeseen
developments" and application of the causation standard, are
contrary to the United States' international legal obligations.8
Similarly, various special provisions in U.S. trade law pertaining to
NAIFTA countries have been found to be contrary to the United
States' international obligations
II. OVERVIEW OF SECTION 201
As early as 1934, the United States acknowledged that an
increase in imports resulting from liberalized trade policies could
harm U.S. producers. 10 As liberalization moved forward and trade
4. N. Gregory Mankiw & Phillip L. Swagel, Antidumping: The Third Rail of Trade
Policy, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, July-Aug. 2005, at 118.
5. See, e.g., World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November
2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 I.L.M. 746 (2002).
6. See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, United States - Safeguard Measures on Imports
of Fresh, Chilled or Frozen Lamb Meat from New Zealand and Australia,
WT/DS177/AB/R, WT/DS178/AB/R (May 1, 2001) [hereinafter Lamb Meat Appellate
Body Report]; Appellate Body Report, United States - Definitive Safeguard Measures on
Imports of Certain Steel Products, WT/DS248/AB/R, WT/DS249/AB/R, WT/DS251/AB/R,
WT/DS252/AB/R, WT/DS253/AB/R, WT/DS254/AB/R, WT/DS258/AB/R,
WT/DS259/AB/R (Nov. 10, 2003) [hereinafter Steel Products Appellate Body Report].
7. See, e.g., Lamb Meat Appellate Body Report, supra note 6; Steel Products
Appellate Body Report, supra note 6.
8. See, e.g., Steel Products Appellate Body Report, supra note 6; see also Appellate
Body Report, United States - Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Wheat Gluten
From the European Communities, WT/DS166/AB/R (Dec. 22, 2000) [hereinafter Wheat
Gluten Appellate Body Report].
9. See, e.g., Steel Products Appellate Body Report, supra note 6; see also Wheat
Gluten Appellate Body Report, supra note 8.
10. STAFF OF H. COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 105TH CONG., OVERVIEW AND
COMPILATION OF U.S. TRADE STATUTES 99 (Comm. Print 1997).
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expanded across the globe, U.S. policymakers identified a need for
flexibility in adjusting to new import levels.' Even if foreign
exporters did not necessarily engage in unfair trade practices,
legislators recognized that some form of relief should be provided
to the sectors of the economy harmed by the increased
competition. 2 Accordingly, in the 1940s, the United States began
to enter into trade agreements that included "escape clause" or
"safeguard" mechanisms to provide this type of relief.3
These escape clause mechanisms are now firmly rooted in
U.S. law. 14 In the wake of the Second World War, the United
States signed on to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
("GATT"), which provides:
If as a result of unforeseen developments and of the effect
of the obligations incurred by a contracting party under
this Agreement, including tariff concessions, any product
that is being imported into the territory of that contracting
party in such increased quantities and under such
conditions as to cause or threaten serious injury to
domestic producers in that territory of like or directly
competitive products, the contracting party shall be free,
in respect of such product, and to the extent and for such
time as may be necessary to prevent or remedy such
injury, to suspend the obligation in whole or in part or to
withdraw or modify the concession.
15
Pursuant to this provision, Congress included Section 201 in
the Trade Act of 1974.16 Commonly known as the "escape
clause,' 7 Section 201 mirrors GATT Article XIX and allows the
President to protect a seriously injured domestic industry as it
adjusts to increased import competition.
The federal agency responsible for conducting Section 201
safeguard investigations is the ITC, an independent federal agency
11. SENATE FINANCE COMMITTEE REPORT ON THE TRADE ACT OF 1974, S. REP.
No. 93-1298, at 119 (1973), as reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7186, 7263.
12. STAFF OF H. COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 105TH CONG., supra note 10.
13. Id.
14. See S. REP. NO. 93-1298, at 119.
15. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. XIX(1)(a), Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat.
A-58, 55 U.N.T.S. 258 [hereinafter GAT].
16. See 19 U.S.C. § 2252 (2000).
17. Y.S. Lee, Reflections on U.S. International Trade Law and Practice -
Compatibility with the WTO Rules and Call for Modification, 12 CURRENTS: INT'L
TRADE L.J. 31, 31 (2003).
18. STAFF OF H. COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 105TH CONG., supra note 10.
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with quasi-judicial authority. 9  The ITC is charged with
determining whether "an article is being imported into the United
States in such increased quantities as to be a substantial cause of
serious injury, or the threat thereof, to the domestic industry
producing an article like or directly competitive with the imported
article." A substantial cause is defined as "a cause which is
important and not less than any other cause., 21 Consequently, both
the injury and causal standards are higher in a Section 201
investigation as compared to an anti-dumping or countervailing
duty case.22 If the ITC makes an affirmative injury determination
under Section 201, the investigation proceeds to a remedy phase.
During the remedy phase, ITC recommends specific actions to
address the serious injury to the domestic industry.
Once the ITC issues its recommendations, the President has
sixty days 24 to "take all appropriate and feasible action. . . [to]
facilitate efforts by the domestic industry to make a positive
adjustment to import competition and provide greater economic
and social benefits than costs. 25 Some actions that the President
may authorize include increasing or imposing duties, imposing a
tariff-rate quota, modifying or imposing quantitative restrictions,
implementing adjustment measures, withdrawing or modifying26
concessions provided to U.S. trading partners, and commencing
negotiations with foreign governments to limit exports into the
United States. 7
III. OVERVIEW OF WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROCESS
Before the creation of the WTO, the GATT provisions were
the only generally available multilateral mechanism for the
resolution of trade remedy disputes. The Uruguay Round of global
trade negotiations in the late 1980s and early 1990s gave birth not
only to the WTO, but also to a new set of rules regarding
19. Id.
20. 19 U.S.C. § 2252(b)(1)(A).
21. Id. § 2252(b)(1)(B).
22. Charles Owen Verrill, Jr., Partner, Wiley Rein & Fielding LLP, An Introduction
to Trade Remedies Available Under U.S. Law (Apr. 1, 1999),
http://www.wrf.com/publication.cfm?publicationid=8009. See also 19 U.S.C. § 1677.
23. 19 U.S.C. § 2252(e).
24. Id. § 2253(4)(a).
25. See id. § 2251.
26. GATT, supra note 15, art. XXVII. See also 19 U.S.C. § 2253.
27. 19 U.S.C. § 2253.
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safeguard actions and a new process for resolving disputes that
arise under them, including the establishment of a permanent
dispute resolution body.
The principal U.S. objective in the safeguards negotiations at
the Uruguay Round was to develop an agreement that would
clarify the obligations and procedures for a safeguard action and
that would "encourage WTO members to use rather than by-pass
safeguard rules. 29  Unfortunately, it is doubtful that either
objective was achieved.) Nonetheless, the resulting Agreement on
Safeguards greatly improved the legal groundwork laid by the
GATT, incorporating many elements taken directly from Section
201 and including provisions concerning: (1) determinations of
injury and increasing imports, (2) procedures to ensure
transparency, (3) an eight-year maximum duration, (4) progressive
liberalization of safeguard restrictions ("degressivity"), and (5) the
right to re-impose safeguard restrictions at a later date.3 ,
The WTO's Dispute Settlement Understanding ("DSU")32
addresses the United States' "strong interest in having an effective
process to enforce U.S. rights under the Uruguay Round
Agreements" and provides the framework for the resolution of
disputes arising under the Agreement on Safeguards.3 3 When such a
28. See generally Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of
Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994).
29. THE URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENTS ACT, STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE
ACTION, H.R. DOc. NO. 103-316, at 286 (1994), as reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4040,
4261.
30. As discussed below, initially many thought that the new agreement supplanted
rather than supplemented the GATI, thereby eliminating the "unforeseen developments"
requirement with respect to escape clause actions. However, the Appellate Body has
indicated that the Agreements must be read conterminously, and that the "unforeseen
developments" requirement is still in effect. Appellate Body Report, Korea - Definitive
Safeguard Measure on Imports of Certain Dairy Products, paras. 82, 84, 90,
WNT/DS98/AB/R (Dec. 22, 1999). This has only perpetuated the uncertainty that existed
prior to 1994. More tragically, the fact that the WTO has stricken every single U.S.
safeguard action that it has reviewed only creates further international tensions.
31. H.R. DOC. NO. 103-316, at 287; see also Agreement on Safeguards, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1869
U.N.T.S. 154 arts. 4, 7(3)-(6), 33 I.L.M. 1125, in WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, THE
RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS: THE
LEGAL TEXTS 315-24 (1994) [hereinafter Safeguards Agreement].
32. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes,
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex
2, Legal Instruments - Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter
DSU].
33. H.R. DOC. NO. 103-316, at 339.
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dispute arises, the complaining state must first seek to resolve the
issue through consultations with the offending state. 34 If the
offending state does not respond to the request for consultations,
or if the parties are unable to reach a satisfactory settlement within
sixty days (twenty days for urgent cases or cases involving
perishable goods), the complaining party may submit a complaint
to the Dispute Settlement Body ("DSB") of the WTO, a panel
charged with governing the dispute process on behalf of all WTO
member governments. Once a complaint is submitted for
settlement, the DSB will establish a panel to hear the dispute.36
WTO panels typically consist of three panelists who have expertise
in international trade law. Panelists are chosen on an ad hoc basis• • 38
to resolve a particular dispute, although the WTO Secretariat
does maintain a list of qualified panelists. After a panel receives
written and oral submissions from both the parties to the dispute• . . 40
as well as interested third parties, it will draft an interim report
and circulate it to the parties for comment .41 These comments will
42then be considered by the panel as it drafts its final report.
Once the panel issues the final report, the parties to the
dispute may appeal. If they choose not to appeal, the panel report
will be adopted as binding on the parties unless the DSB decides
by consensus that it should not be. Appeals are limited to issues
of law discussed in the panel report and are heard by the
Appellate Body, a standing panel of seven experts in international
trade law. Unlike panelists, persons serving on the Appellate
Body cannot have any governmental affiliation.4 The Appellate
Body will typically hear and report on the appeal within sixty
34. DSU, supra note 32, art. 4.3.
35. Id. art. 2.1.
36. Id. arts. 4.3, 4.7, 4.8.
37. Id. arts. 8.1-8.5. A panel may be composed of five panelists if the parties to the
dispute so agree.
38. Id. arts. 8.6-8.7.
39. Id. art. 8.4.
40. Id. art. 10.1. For an overview of WTO panel working procedures, see generally id.
App. 3.
41. Id. arts. 15.1-15.2.
42. Id. art. 15.3.
43. Id. art. 17.4.
44. Id. art. 16.4.
45. Id. art. 17.6.
46. Id. art. 17.3.
47. Id.
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days,48 and may uphold, reverse, or modify the panel's legal
analysis.49 The Appellate Body does not have the ability to remand
cases to the panels. If it finds that the panel report provides an
adequate factual record, the Appellate Body may complete its
analysis of a claim on which it has reversed the panel. Unless the
DSB decides otherwise by consensus, it adopts the Appellate Body
Report.52 If a party fails to implement the recommendations within
a reasonable amount of time, the aggrieved party may request
negotiations to determine mutually acceptable compensation. If
these negotiations prove fruitless, the aggrieved party may suspend
the application of certain trade concessions or obligations under
54
the WTO agreements with respect to the non-compliant party.
The WTO dispute settlement system cannot order a country
to change its laws. A state that loses a dispute at the WTO may
choose to change its laws, may offer trade "compensation," or may
decide to do nothing. In the latter case, the complaining state
may retaliate by suspending trade concessions that are equivalent
to the trade benefits it has lost.57
IV. THE PROBLEMS WITH SECTION 201 IN LIGHT OF WTO REVIEW
A. Background: The Steel Case
As previously noted, the United States has lost every
safeguard action challenged at the WTO. One recent loss, the
United States - Steel case, involved arguably the largest safeguard
investigation ever undertaken by the ITC, and serves as a good
example of the difficulties that the United States is encountering in
coordinating its Section 201 actions with its international
48. Id. art. 17.5.
49. Id. art. 17.13.
50. See id.
51. Appellate Body Report, European Communities - Measures Affecting Asbestos
and Asbestos-Containing Products, para. 78 & nn. 48-49, WT/DS135/AB/R (Mar. 12,
2001).
52. DSU, supra note 32, art. 17.14.
53. Id. art. 22.2. The reasonable period of time is either a time period proposed by the
party and accepted by the DSB, a period of time agreed upon by the parties to the dispute,
or a period of time determined by binding negotiation. Id. art. 21.3.
54. Id. art. 22.2-22.4.
55. THE URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENTS ACT, STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE
ACTION, H.R. DOc. NO. 103-316 at 339 (1994), as reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 4040, 4300.
56. H.R. DOC. NO. 103-316, at 340.
57. Id.
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obligations. The backlash from this case and others like it may
have serious anti-WTO repercussions in the United States.
In June 2001, President Bush initiated a Section 201
investigation to determine whether certain steel articles were
being imported into the United States in such increased quantities
as to cause or threaten substantial injury to the domestic industry. 8
The Commission conducted numerous days of hearings, and the
parties submitted tens of thousands of pages in pleadings. The ITC
concluded that twelve steel import products (out of thirty-three
categories) were a cause of serious injury, or threat thereof, to the
domestic industry. 9  Several nations challenged the ITC's
determination at the WTO and won at both the panel and the
Appellate Body.60 The final report of the Appellate Body found
that the ITC's determination failed to satisfy the requirements of
the Agreement on Safeguards, specifically with respect to, inter
alia, the unforeseen developments requirement, the causation
standard applied, and the parallelism doctrine. This section will
analyze each of these three elements.
B. Unforeseen Developments
Under Article XIX(1)(a) of the GATT, in order to serve as
the basis for a safeguard action, a flood of damaging imports must
be "a result of unforeseen developments.",6' Both the GATT 1947
and the GATT 1994 include this "unforeseen developments"
requirement, but the Agreement on Safeguards-which entered
into force at the same time as the GATT 1994 and was intended to
clarify it-conspicuously omits any mention of unforeseen
developments.6 ' This omission is particularly glaring in Article 2.1
of the Agreement on Safeguards, which otherwise closely reflects
the language of Article XIX(1)(a) of the GATT. Indeed, many
58. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, Steel, Investigation No. TA-201-73, USITC Pub. 3479
(Dec. 2001).
59. Press Release, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, ITC Details Its Determinations
Concerning Impact of Imports of Steel on U.S. Industry (Oct. 23, 2001), available at
http://www.usitc.gov/er/nl2001/ER1023Yl.pdf [hereinafter ITC Determination].
60. Panel Report, United States - Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Certain
Steel Products, VT/DS248/R, WT/DS249/R, WT/DS251/R, WT/DS252/R, WT/DS253/R,
WT/DS254/R, WT/DS258/R, WT/DS259/R (July 11, 2003) [hereinafter Steel Products
Panel Report]; Steel Products Appellate Body Report, supra note 6.
61. GATT, supra note 15, art. XIX(1)(a).
62. Safeguards Agreement, supra note 31, art. 4.2(b).
63. Compare id. ("A Member may apply a safeguard measure to a product only if
that Member has determined, pursuant to the provisions set out below, that such product
[Vol. 29:43
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believed that the "unforeseen developments" requirement was
consciously eliminated in the negotiations for the Agreement on
Safeguards.64 The conflict between the GATT and the Agreement
on Safeguards had thus created doubt as to whether a Member
implementing a safeguard action under the Agreement on
Safeguards was still required to demonstrate that the damaging
imports were the result of unforeseen developments.
The panel decisions in Korea - Dairy and Argentina -
Footwear squarely addressed the omission of the unforeseen
developments requirement from the Agreement on Safeguards.
65
The panel on Argentina - Footwear found that "the express
omission of the criterion of unforeseen developments in the new
agreement (which otherwise transposes, reflects and refines in
great detail the essential conditions for the imposition of safeguard
measures provided for in Article XIX of GATT) must, in our view,
have meaning. 66 The panel concluded that a demonstration of
unforeseen developments was not required, since "conformity with
the explicit requirements and conditions embodied in the
Safeguards Agreement must be sufficient for the application of
safeguard measures within the meaning of Article XIX of
GATT." 67 The panel on Korea - Dairy reached a similar
conclusion.68
The Appellate Body in Korea - Dairy, however, disagreed,
concluding instead that "any safeguard measure imposed after the
entry into force of the WTO Agreement must comply with the
provisions of both the Agreement on Safeguards and Article XIX
of the GATT 1994," including the unforeseen developments
is being imported into its territory in such increased quantities, absolute or relative to
domestic production, and under such conditions as to cause or threaten to cause serious
injury to the domestic industry that produces like or directly competitive products."), with
GATT art. XIX(1)(a), supra note 15 (that the imported products be "a result of
unforeseen developments").
64. See, e.g., Christy Ledet, Causation of Injury in Safeguards Cases: Why the U.S.
Can't Win, 34 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 713, 717,731 (2003).
65. Panel Report, Korea - Definitive Safeguard Measure on Imports of Certain Dairy
Products, para. 7.33-7.48, WT/DS98/R (June 21, 1999) [hereinafter Dairy Products Panel
Report]; Panel Report, Argentina - Safeguard Measures on Imports on Footwear,
WT/DS121/R (June 25, 1999) [hereinafter Footwear Panel Report]
66. Footwear Panel Report, supra note 65, para. 8.58 (emphasis in original).
67. Id. para. 8.67.
68. Dairy Products Panel Report, supra note 65, para. 7.33-7.48.
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69
requirement. In reaching its conclusion, the Appellate Body
relied on Article 11.1(a) of the Agreement on Safeguards, which
states that "[a] Member shall not take or seek any emergency
action on imports of particular products as set forth in Article XIX
of GA TT 1994 unless such action conforms with the provisions of
that Article applied in accordance with this Agreement."7 ° In Korea
- Dairy and Argentina - Footwear, the Appellate Body also began
to address the question of what exactly a member must show in
order to satisfy the unforeseen developments requirement. First,
"the developments . . .must have been 'unexpected.' 71 Second,
the Appellate Body concluded that although the clause does not
"[establish] independent conditions for the application of a
safeguard measure," it does "[describe] certain circumstances
which must be demonstrated as a matter of fact in order for a
safeguard measure to be applied consistently with the provisions of
Article XIX of the GATT 1994. ,12 However, this is as far as the
Appellate Body went in its explanation of the unforeseen
developments requirement. Because the panel made no factual
findings on the issue of unforeseen developments, and because the
facts were contested by the parties, the Appellate Body refused to
decide whether the requisite showing was made, leaving a number
of questions unanswered for future decisions to resolve.
In the United States - Steel safeguard proceeding, the WTO
panel admitted that "there is no reference to unforeseen
developments in the Agreement on Safeguards.' , 74 However,
following its decisions in Korea - Dairy and Argentina - Footwear,
the panel explained that the Agreement on Safeguards and the
69. Appellate Body Report, Korea - Definitive Safeguard Measure on Imports of
Certain Dairy Products, para. 77, WT/DS98/AB/R (Dec. 14, 1999) [hereinafter Dairy
Products Appellate Body Report] (emphasis in original; footnote in original omitted); see
also Appellate Body Report, Argentina - Safeguard Measures on Imports of Footwear,
para. 84, WT/DS121/AB/R (Dec. 14, 1999) [hereinafter Footwear Appellate Body
Report].
70. Safeguards Agreement, supra note 31, art. 11.1(a) (emphasis added). The
Appellate Body also sought support from the Safeguards Agreement, which provides:
"This Agreement establishes rules for the application of safeguard measures which shall be
understood to mean those measures provided for in Article XIX of GATT 1994." Id. art. 1
(emphasis added).
71. Footwear Appellate Body Report, supra note 69, paras. 91-94; Dairy Products
Appellate Body Report, supra note 69, paras. 84-87.
72. Footwear Appellate Body Report, supra note 69, para. 92; Dairy Products
Appellate Body Report, supra note 69, para. 85.
73. Dairy Products Appellate Body Report, supra note 69, para. 92.
74. Steel Products Panel Report, supra note 60, para. 10.36.
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GATT must be read conterminously and required the United
States to show that the flood of imports at issue resulted from
unforeseen developments. 7' The ITC found that unforeseen
developments, such as the economic crises in Russia and Asia, the
continued strength of the U.S. economy, and the persistent
appreciation of the U.S. dollar, caused the increase in steel
imports.76 Even though the panel agreed that these represented "a
plausible set of unforeseen developments that may have resulted
in increased imports to the United States from various sources," it
held that the ITC's Report "[fell] short of demonstrating that such
developments actually resulted in increased imports into the
United States causing serious injury to the relevant domestic
producers., 77 Because the ITC only demonstrated that unforeseen
developments caused a general increase in steel imports but not
how unforeseen developments led to increased imports of specific
products, the panel determined that the Section 201 action was
inconsistent with both the GATT and the Agreement on
Safeguards. The Appellate Body upheld this ruling on appeal.78
C. The Non-Attribution Requirement of Injury Causation
To serve as a basis for a safeguard action, U.S. law requires
the ITC to find that the increase in imports is "a substantial cause
of serious injury, or threat thereof, to the domestic industry
producing an article like or directly competitive with the imported
article."' ,- Article 4.2(b) of the Agreement on Safeguards also
requires the aggrieved party to demonstrate "the existence of the
causal link between increased imports of the product concerned
and serious injury or threat thereof."80 However, the ITC and the
WTO interpret this requirement quite differently. The ITC
concept of causation requires that there be a causal link between
increased imports and injury to the domestic industry; it must be
determined that imports are no less important than any other
potential source of injury. 8  Alternatively, the WTO's
interpretation effectively requires the ITC to identify and
75. Id. paras. 10.36-10.37.
76. Id. para. 10.4.
77. Id. para. 10.122.
78. Steel Products Appellate Body Report, supra note 6, para. 513(a).
79. 19 U.S.C. § 2251(a) (2000).
80. Safeguards Agreement, supra note 31, art. 4.2(b).
81. Ledet, supra note 64, at 721.
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systematically rule out all of the possible alternative causes of
injury other than the increase of imports at issue. 2 Commentators
criticize this requirement, pointing out that this type of separation
and quantification of possible causes of injury is "realistically
impossible.
83
The Appellate Body stated that Article 4.2(b) does not
require that increased imports be the sole cause of the serious
injury. 84 The Appellate Body found that the language in Article
4.2(b) forbidding the attribution of injury caused by "factors other
than increased imports" to increased imports does not mean that
the existence of such factors will prevent a party from meeting the
causation standard.8' Rather, the Appellate Body agreed only with
the panel's interpretation of this language to mean that "the
effects caused by increased imports must be distinguished from the
effects caused by other factors.8 6 Thus, the Appellate Body found
that there may be several factors contributing simultaneously to
the injury suffered by the domestic industry, and that subject
imports need not be the only source of injury, but rather a
sufficient one.
According to the procedure laid out by the Appellate Body in
Wheat Gluten, the first step in the causation analysis is to
distinguish the injurious effects caused to the domestic industry by
the imports from the injurious effects caused by other factors."
Second, the competent authorities must examine the injury caused
by imports, as distinct from the injury caused by all of the other
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Wheat Gluten Appellate Body Report, supra note 8, paras. 66-79.
85. Id. paras. 67-69.
86. Id. paras. 66, 79.
87. Id. para. 69. The Appellate Body also relied on Article 2.1 of the Safeguards
Agreement for its interpretation of Articles 4.2(a) and 4.2(b). Id. para. 75. According to
this provision, "a safeguard measure may be applied if a 'product is being imported ... in
such increased quantities ... and under such conditions as to cause.. .' serious injury." Id.
para. 76 (emphasis in original). The Appellate Body reasoned that this implies that factors
causing injury separate from the import increase do not prevent a finding of causation. Id.
paras. 77-78. See Wheat Gluten, para. 69. The Appellate Body also relied on Article 2.1 of
the Agreement on Safeguards for its interpretation of Articles 4.2(a) and 4.2(b). Id. para.
75. According to this provision, "a safeguard measure may be applied if a 'product is being
imported . . . in such increased quantities ... and under such conditions as to cause ... '
serious injury." Id. para. 76 (emphasis in original). The Appellate Body reasoned that this
implies that factors causing injury separate from the import increase do not prevent a
finding of causation. Id. paras. 77-78.
88. See Wheat Gluten Appellate Body Report, supra note 8, para. 69.
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different factors.89 It is noteworthy that the Appellate Body did not
suggest that the injury caused by the different factors needs to be
individually accounted for, but must simply be distinguished from
that caused by the imports. 90 Finally, the authority must determine
"whether 'the causal link' exists between increased imports and
serious injury, and whether this causal link involves a genuine and
substantial relationship of cause and effect between these two
elements, as required by the Agreement on Safeguards."91
However, the Appellate Body arguably did not practice what
it preached. In completing its analysis of causation, it concluded
that increases in the average available capacity of U.S. producers
of wheat gluten were occurring at the same time that imports were
increasing.2 The Appellate Body suggested that increases in
average capacity may have caused injury to the domestic industry3
which could be attributed to injury caused by increased imports.
The Appellate Body suggested that increases in average capacity
may have caused injury to the domestic industry, which could have
been attributed to the injury caused by increased imports.94 The
Appellate Body therefore concluded that the ITC did not
adequately demonstrate, as required by Article 4.2(b), that any
"injury" caused to the domestic industry by increases in average
capacity was not attributed to increased imports. 95 Consequently,
the ITC could not establish the existence of the requisite causal
link between the increased imports and the serious injury.96
At best, the Appellate Body's decision in Wheat Gluten may
be seen as a partial victory for both sides of the causation standard
dispute: the Appellate Body generally affirmed the United States'
approach and interpretation of the causation standard in safeguard
actions, while ultimately ruling in favor of the EU and finding the
determination of the ITC to be inadequate in this particular case.
At worst, the WTO paid lip service to the United States by
theoretically refusing to adopt the insurmountable standard that
the panel attempted to establish, while effectively maintaining
such a standard through its analysis. Indeed, although the
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. paras. 81-88.
94. Id. paras. 90-91.
94. Id.
95. Id. para. 91.
96. Id.
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Appellate Body has at times upheld certain U.S. interpretations of
the non-attribution standard, in the end it has struck down every
single ITC safeguard action that has been challenged, including
Steel.
D. NAFTA Provisions/Doctrine of Parallelism
The Doctrine of Parallelism provides, in essence, that all
imports included in an injury analysis in a safeguard case must also
be covered by the safeguard remedy." This requirement has
proven to be yet another stumbling block for the ITC at the WTO
with respect to its determinations affecting nations that have
signed free trade agreements with the United States, such as the
North America Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA") co-
signatories. Specifically, the WTO disagrees with the provision
under U.S. law which allows the President to exclude from a
safeguard remedy those imports from NAF-TA countries which do
not account for a substantial share of total imports or do not
"contribute importantly to the serious injury, or threat thereof,
found by the [ITC].' 8
In Wheat Gluten, the ITC determined that increased imports
of wheat gluten from all sources were causing or threatening to
cause serious injury to the domestic industry. However, pursuant
to 19 U.S.C. § 3372,the ITC excluded Canadian imports from the
safeguard remedy.1k Although the ITC included Canada in its
initial investigation, it went on to separately examine the impact of
imports from Canada on the domestic industry and concluded
"that imports from Canada are not contributing importantly to the
serious injury caused by imports."' 0'1 The WTO panel faulted the
ITC's methodology and found that "the United States acted
inconsistently with Articles 2.1 and 4.2 [of the Agreement on
Safeguards] by excluding imports from Canada from the
application of the safeguard measure."
10 2
97. See Steel Products Panel Report, supra note 60, paras. 10.589-10.591.
98. 19 U.S.C. § 3372(a)-(b) (2000).
99. Panel Report, United States - Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Wheat
Gluten From the European Communities, para. 2.8, WT/DS166/R (July 31, 2000)
[hereinafter Wheat Gluten Panel Report].
100. Id.
101. Id. para. 8.162.
102. Id. para. 8.182.
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On appeal, the United States argued that 19 U.S.C. § 3372 is
not inconsistent with its obligations under the Agreement on
Safeguards.0 3 The United States noted that "Article 9.1 of the
Agreement... requires that imports from developing countries be
excluded from the application of a safeguard measure," and,
similar to the NAFTA provisions, "does not provide for the
exclusion of such imports from the investigation, or require any
finding that the imports subject to the measure, 'in and of
themselves' cause serious mlury." The United States also pointed
out that the panel failed to take the ITC's "separate and
subsequent examination" concerning Canadian imports into
account.
Dismissing the United States' analogical arguments regarding
Article 9.1 of the Agreement on Safeguards in a footnote, 1 6 the
Appellate Body instead focused on the language of Articles 2.1
and 2.2 in its analysis. The Appellate Body ruled that including
imports from all sources in the injury determination and then
"exclud[ing] imports from one source from the application of the
measure would give the phrase 'product being imported' a
different meaning in Articles 2.1 and 2.2," and thus would be
"incongruous and unwarranted."'107 Therefore, imports included in
the injury determination under Articles 2.1 and 4.2 must
correspond exactly to the imports included in the application of
the measure under Article 2.2.
The Appellate Body further found that, although the ITC
examined the importance of Canadian imports separately, it did
not make any explicit determination that increased imports
excluding imports from Canada were causing injury pursuant to
Articles 2.1 and 4.2.108 The Appellate Body thus concluded that the
exclusion of Canadian imports prevented the ITC from meeting
the causation standard set out in Article 4.2(b). It is important to
note, however, that although the Appellate Body held that the
United States acted inconsistently with its obligations under the
Agreement on Safeguards, it did not find that the U.S. NAFTA
103. Wheat Gluten Appellate Body Report, supra note 8, paras. 9-11.
104. Id. para. 13.
105. Id. paras. 93-94 (quoting Wheat Gluten Panel Report, supra note 99, para. 8.161).
106. Wheat Gluten Appellate Body Report, supra note 8, para. 96 n.96. The Appellate
Body agreed with the EU's argument that Article 9.1 is an exception to the general rules
that applies only to developing countries, and as such is not relevant to the appeal.
107. Id.
108. Id. para. 98 (emphasis in original).
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legislation itself was inconsistent with the Agreement or the
GATT.
1
0
9
The WTO's decision in United States - Steel essentially
affirmed the Wheat Gluten holding that imports included in the
injury determination must correspond with those products covered
in the remedy. If there is a "gap" between the imports that were
determined to have caused injury and those covered in the
remedy, then the relevant authority must explicitly demonstrate
that the imports included in the safeguard remedy are, in and of
themselves, sufficient to satisfy all of the conditions for a safeguard
action.11
In Steel, as in Wheat Gluten, certain aspects of the United
States' safeguard remedy excluded imports from certain countries
(here, Canada, Mexico, Israel, and Jordan). After learning its
lesson in Wheat Gluten, the ITC in Steel issued a report specifically
demonstrating that the imports from non-NAFTA countries alone,
considered separately from those of NAFTA countries, were a
substantial cause of serious injury to domestic flat-rolled
producers."' Despite the ITC's seeming compliance with the
WTO's earlier rulings, the panel nevertheless refused to accept the
conclusions of the ITC report. The panel reasoned that the ITC's
determination that non-NAFTA imports had the same
characteristics as all imports (which were found to be a cause of
serious injury) was not equivalent to a determination that non-
NAFTA imports had the identical effects as these other imports:
"The United States' explanation does not address the possibility
that, unlike all imports, non-NAFTA imports are not a cause of
serious injury in the sense of having a genuine and substantial
relationship of cause and effect."112 Thus, the panel concluded that
the Steel safeguard action was inconsistent with both the
parallelism and the non-attribution requirements of the Agreement
on Safeguards because it failed to ensure that the injury caused by
other factors was not attributed to non-NAFTA imports.
109. The Appellate Body agreed with the panel that "this dispute does not raise the
issue of whether, as a general principle, a member of a free-trade area can exclude imports
from other members of that free-trade area from the application of a safeguard measure."
Id. para. 99.
110. Steel Products Panel Report, supra note 60, para. 10.591.
111. Id. para. 10.593.
112. Id. para. 10.603.
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V. CONCLUSION
Section 201 is an important and potentially very useful trade
remedy tool, and has many strong supporters in the United
States.1 However, given that the WTO has struck down every
single safeguard action taken by the United States, there is much
concern regarding the ability of the WTO's trade dispute
resolution procedures to function in harmony with this remedy, or
even to coexist with it. There is, at best, a questionable level of
political motivation to amend U.S. domestic law to bring it into
line with Appellate Body safeguard decisions. Similarly, it is highly
unlikely that the Agreement on Safeguards or the Dispute
Settlement Understanding will be amended to align with current
ITC practice.
Certain U.S. industries that have considerable input into U.S.
trade policy have candidly expressed concerns regarding the
WTO's lack of deference and the potential political backlash
should it continue. Further decisions by the WTO striking down
U.S. safeguard actions, whether fair or not, may have significant
and long-reaching negative political effects, both in the United
States and in the international trading system. Even critics of anti-
dumping measures acknowledge the necessity of safeguard
negotiations at the WTO. They admit that a "series of WTO
rulings has indeed made it difficult for the ITC to find that imports
hurt an American industry at least as much as any other cause. '1 4
A useful tool in future negotiations would be to clarify the rules
governing safeguards in the WTO to facilitate their temporary
use. 1 5 The United States and the WTO need to work together to
improve the existing system so that the ITC may bring valid
safeguard actions that will not automatically be struck down, while
the WTO retains its power to strike actions that do not comply
with the agreed upon criteria. This opportunity will not last
indefinitely; the United States should bring these issues to the fore
as quickly as possible.
113. Mankiw & Swagel, supra note 4, at 107.
114. Id. at 118.
115. Id.
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